The employment effects of terminating disability benefits by Timothy J. Moore
Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series
Working Paper No. 2/15
The Employment Effects of  
Terminating Disability Benefits
Timothy J. Moore
 
 
The Employment Effects of  
Terminating Disability Benefits* 
 
Timothy J. Moore 
Department of Economics, The George Washington University; and  
National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
 
Melbourne Institute Working Paper No. 2/15 
 
ISSN 1328-4991 (Print) 
ISSN 1447-5863 (Online) 
ISBN 978-0-7340-4370-2  
 
January 2015 
 
 
* I wish to especially thank Mark Duggan, Bill Evans, John Ham and Melissa Kearney for 
helpful comments and suggestions, as well as Rich Burkhauser, Lisa Dettling, Seth 
Freedman, Eric French, Craig Garthwaite, Don Parsons, Steve Pischke and Belen Sbrancia. 
Useful feedback was also provided by participants at the IZA Conference on Risky 
Behaviors, Michigan Retirement Research Consortium Conference, and the NBER Summer 
Institute, and in seminars at Cornell University, Federal Board of Governors, George 
Washington University, London School of Economics, Monash University, Royal Holloway 
College, University of Maryland, University College London, University of Melbourne, 
University of New South Wales, University of Notre Dame, University of Warwick, and the 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Thanks also to David Pattison, Jeffrey 
Hemmeter, Sherry Barber, Stuart Friedrich and Bernard Wixon for help in accessing the data 
used for this project, and for providing background on Social Security Administration 
programs and data systems. Part of this work was developed while visiting the University of 
Melbourne, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. Financial support was provided by 
the Visiting Research Scholar program offered by the University of Melbourne, the Drug 
Policy Modeling Program at the University of New South Wales, through a Dissertation 
Fellowship in Retirement Income and Disability Insurance Research from the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College, and during two periods as an intern in the SSA’s 
Office of Research, Evaluation and Statistics. Email: tim_moore@gwu.edu. 
 
 
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research 
The University of Melbourne 
Victoria 3010 Australia 
Telephone (03) 8344 2100 
Fax (03) 8344 2111 
Email melb-inst@unimelb.edu.au 
WWW Address http://www.melbourneinstitute.com 
  
 
2 
 
Abstract 
Few Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries return to the labor force, making 
it hard to assess their likely employment in the absence of benefits. Using administrative data, 
I examine the employment of individuals who lost DI eligibility after the 1996 removal of 
drug and alcohol addictions as qualifying conditions. Approximately 22 percent started 
working at levels that would have disqualified them for DI, an employment response that is 
large relative to their work histories. Those who received DI for 2-3 years had the largest 
response, suggesting that a period of public assistance may maximize the employment of 
some disabled individuals. 
 
JEL classification: H53, H55, J14 
Keywords: Disability insurance, social security, health capital, labor force participation 
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1. Introduction 
Governments in many industrialized countries are trying to reduce the size of their 
disability insurance programs and increase the employment of disabled individuals. In the 
United States, where four percent of 18 to 64 year olds receive Social Security Disability 
Insurance (DI) and a further two percent receive federal disability benefits through the 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, recent efforts include providing beneficiaries 
with work incentives and employment support services through the “Ticket to Work” 
program and mandating funds for medical reassessments of current beneficiaries (Social 
Security Administration (SSA), 2013a). In the United Kingdom, where the fraction of the 
working-age population receiving disability benefits is similar to the US, reforms have 
resulted in reduced benefits, vocational support, and time limits for beneficiaries judged 
capable of working (Berthoud, 2011). Many other European countries have also recently 
introduced policies to reduce the number of disability beneficiaries.1 
A growing literature has estimated how many individuals would work if they were not 
eligible for disability insurance. Starting with Bound (1989), most of these studies have used 
the employment of denied applicants to estimate the likely employment of accepted 
applicants (e.g., Chen and van der Klaauw, 2008; von Wachter, Manchester and Song, 2011; 
Maestas, Mullen and Strand, 2013; French and Song, 2014). The relationship between 
disability benefits and labor force participation has also been estimated using variation in 
benefit generosity in the United States (Autor and Duggan, 2003) and Canada (Gruber, 2000), 
differences in disability insurance rejection rates in the United States (Gruber and Kubik, 
1997), and changes in disability eligibility criteria in Austria (Staubli, 2011). All of these 
studies focus on employment before or at the time of application, and as a result they provide 
good estimates of how employment might change as a result of limiting entry into these 
disability programs. 
Studies examining policies that affect labor force participation during or after the 
receipt of disability insurance are far less common. There is recent evidence that beneficiaries 
do respond to work incentives, such as increasing their labor supply after the reduction of 
earnings penalties in Norway (Kostol and Mogstad, 2014), the introduction of higher earnings 
limits in Canada (Campolieti and Riddell, 2012) and decreases in benefit payments in the 
Netherlands (Borghans, Gielen and Luttmer, 2014). However, research on the employment of 
                                                            
1 Other recent reforms include tightening eligibility criteria in Sweden (Karlstrom, Palme, and Svensson, 2008); 
removing restrictions on work activity in Norway (Kostol and Mogstad, 2012); and comprehensive reforms in 
the Netherlands that included stricter eligibility criteria and widespread reassessments of younger beneficiaries 
(Borghans, Gielen and Luttmer, 2014). 
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individuals after exiting disability insurance is largely limited to documenting the number 
and characteristics of those who exit (e.g., Hennessey, 1996; Schimmel and Stapleton, 2011). 
In this paper, I partly address that gap by examining the employment effects resulting 
from a reform in the United States that resulted in a large number of individuals losing their 
eligibility for DI. In March 1996, Congress removed alcohol and drug addictions as eligible 
conditions, including for those who did not have it as their primary disability. At the time, 
approximately two percent of DI beneficiaries had an alcohol or drug addiction that had 
contributed to their eligibility. Affected individuals could apply for continued eligibility on 
the basis of their other disabilities, and approximately 90 percent did so. Around half were 
judged to be re-eligible for DI, and continued to receive benefits. The remaining 65,000 
individuals had their DI cash payments and benefits terminated in January 1997 (Stapleton et 
al., 1998).2 
This is the only large-scale termination of DI eligibility since major reforms to the 
program in 1984. Figure 1 shows the annual DI exit rates between 1985 and 2012. 
Approximately one percent of beneficiaries exit annually due to no longer being disabled.The 
sole exception is in 1997, when the rate more than doubled due to the terminations examined 
here. Figure 1 also shows that the rate at which beneficiaries return to labor force has 
remained relatively constant, even as exit rates due to death or reaching normal retirement 
age have been declining, as beneficiaries have become younger and more likely to have low-
mortality conditions (Autor and Duggan, 2003).  
Using SSA administrative data and the tax earnings records covering most of the DI 
beneficiaries affected by the policy change, I first show there was a large employment 
response after the removal of disability benefits. This is estimated using difference-in-
differences models with affected beneficiaries who remained on DI as the comparison group, 
as they have similar pre-treatment employment histories to terminated beneficiaries. 
Employment is primarily measured in terms of the 1996 “substantial gainful activity” (SGA) 
earnings threshold ($8,602 per annum in 2013 dollars),3 which is the level at which capacity 
for work is assessed. I find the fraction of terminated DI beneficiaries with annual earnings 
above this threshold increased by 22 percentage points following the termination of disability 
benefits, which is large relative to these individuals’ work histories. It is also far higher than 
                                                            
2 These changes also affected beneficiaries on the means-tested disability benefit program, Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI). I focus on DI because they have much higher labor force participation than SSI 
recipients, and Campbell, Baumohl and Hunt (2003)  and Chatterji and Meara (2010) have previously examined 
the employment of SSI recipients. 
3 All dollars are in 2013 values, unless otherwise noted. Conversions are based on the CPI-U.  
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the base SGA employment of the control group, which is typically one percent per annum. 
The employment effects decline after four years, primarily because some individuals regain 
eligibility for disability benefits. Varying the earnings thresholds at which employment is 
assessed suggests that terminated beneficiaries who started working generally earned more 
than annualized SGA levels, although not much more. 
There is considerable heterogeneity in the employment response. There are large and 
statistically significant differences related to an individual’s age at termination, with the 
employment effects among 30-39 year olds of 25 percentage points being much higher than 
the estimate of 16 percentage points for 50-61 year olds. Terminated beneficiaries also had a 
higher employment response if they had higher earnings prior to getting onto DI or if they 
applied for DI when the unemployment rate was lower. There are not large differences by 
type of addiction, and the employment effects are similar for individuals whose primary 
disability had been an addiction, a mental disorder, or a musculoskeletal condition.  
Individuals had received DI for different lengths of time to prior to the terminations. 
After showing that cohorts of beneficiaries had similar employment and health characteristics 
prior to receiving DI, I examine how the employment effects vary as a function of time 
receiving disability benefits. I find that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between the 
size of the employment effects and time spent on DI. The employment response is highest 
among those who received benefits for approximately 2.7 years prior to termination, and is 50 
percent larger than the employment response of individuals who received benefits for nine 
months (the shortest period of receipt for anyone in the sample) and 31 percent higher than 
those who received benefits for six years. This inverted-U relationship is strongest among 
younger individuals. 
It is surprising that the employment effects do not monotonically decline with time on 
DI, given the widespread evidence that healthy individuals become less able to work the 
longer they are out of the labor force (e.g., Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Kroft, Lange, and 
Notowidigdo, 2013). To better understand the role of initial health, I compare the 
employment effects for those immediately awarded DI to those awarded DI after successfully 
appealing an initial denial. Hu et al. (2001) and von Wachter et al. (2011) find that 
beneficiaries who were initially denied DI are healthier and more able to work than other 
beneficiaries. Among those who had spent less than 1.5 years on DI, the employment 
response for immediately-accepted beneficiaries is lower than for initially-denied 
beneficiaries, which is consistent with this prior evidence. However, the employment 
response for the immediately-awarded group increases sharply with time on DI, so much so 
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that those who had received DI for between two and four years had a larger employment 
response than the initially-denied group. These results suggest that assessments of health and 
work capacity made at the time of application do not necessarily hold over time. They also 
indicate that health changes while on DI may have affected terminated beneficiaries’ ability 
to work, although it is not possible to quantify that effect. It is also not possible to attribute 
any changes to the cash and medical benefits that come with DI eligibility, as mean reversion 
in health is also possible.  
This study complements previous research examining the employment effects of this 
policy, which does not use SSA administrative data and has primarily focused on SSI 
recipients. Chatterji and Meara (2010) use pooled cross-sections of the 1994-2002 National 
Survey of Drug Use and Health and a triple-difference interaction between the probability of 
SSI usage, likely substance abuse and an indicator for the post-policy change to estimate the 
effects of the terminations. They found increases in labor force participation and employment 
in a group with a broad definition of substance abuse, but not among a more narrowly-
defined group. Campbell, Baumohl and Hunt (2003) analyzed the formal and informal 
employment of 661 participants in a study that interviewed former SSI beneficiaries across 
nine cities. Around half were employed two years after their terminations, and 12 percent 
were earning more than the cash benefits they lost. Finally, Orwin et al. (2004) used 
employment records of affected DI and SSI beneficiaries in Washington State. They found 
that employment increased by 10 percentage points after these terminations, although they 
could not distinguish between terminated and reclassified beneficiaries. While these studies 
convincingly establish that the terminations did increase labor force participation, the 
administrative data used here allows me to better understand the nature of these employment 
effects.  
The employment effects estimated here complement existing studies of the labor 
disincentive effects of disability benefits. The aggregate employment effects are similar to 
those of Maestas et al. (2013). Given that the treatment effect is the combined effect of losing 
cash and medical benefits, and no longer being subject to DI work rules – the same 
consequences rejected DI applicants face – the results are relevant to this and other studies 
that use rejected applicants to estimate work capacity. This study also provides insights into 
how recent studies of the labor supply responses among current DI beneficiaries may 
translate into employment after exiting DI. The employment effects are much larger. For 
example, the relatively high employment effects among younger terminated beneficiaries and 
terminated beneficiaries from areas with low unemployment rates are largely consistent with 
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the findings of Kostol and Mogstad (2014) in a very different context. Furthermore, 
examining the heterogeneity in the employment effects by time on DI supplements the 
findings by Borghans et al. (2014), who show that the employment of long-term DI 
beneficiaries increase in response to the cut in benefits, but do not have sufficient statistical 
power to examine heterogeneity in the effects by duration. 
The findings in this paper speak to several policy issues. First, the large employment 
response among a group who rarely exited DI prior to the removal of addictions as eligible 
conditions provides strong evidence of latent work capacity among DI beneficiaries, even if 
they had been on the program for several years. Second, information on the heterogeneity of 
the effects may be useful for improving the efficiency of return-to-work efforts, which have 
had limited success in returning beneficiaries to the labor force partly because there is little 
evidence on which beneficiaries should be targeted (SSA, 2012; Maestas et al., 2013). Third, 
differences by time on DI highlight the importance of considering dynamic effects when 
evaluating the likely employment of current beneficiaries. Judgments about the severity of 
disabilities may not hold over time. These dynamic effects, and the relatively high 
employment among those receiving benefits for two to three years, also raise questions about 
whether temporary benefits are appropriate for some individuals. In efforts to stem the 
growth of these programs, temporary awards may lead to better employment outcomes than 
more restrictive eligibility criteria.  
Given that DI beneficiaries with drug or alcohol addictions were the only ones 
removed, it is difficult to know how the findings would generalize to other beneficiaries. The 
findings are likely to be most relevant to the 19 percent of current DI beneficiaries with a 
history of substance abuse problems.4,5 They are also likely to be especially helpful for 
understanding the work capacity of DI beneficiaries with mental disorders and 
musculoskeletal conditions, as the employment effects are similar for subgroups with these 
conditions as their primary disabilities as for the overall sample. Currently, over half of all DI 
beneficiaries have a mental disorder and musculoskeletal condition as their primary disability 
(SSA, 2013b). 
                                                            
4 The policy change meant that, while applicants to DI could no longer count addictions among their disabilities, 
they could still apply on the basis of other disabilities. Moreover, many disability insurance systems in other 
countries still allow addictions to be considered as disabilities when it comes to gaining eligibility. 
5 Respondents to the National Survey of Drug Use and Health are asked about Medicare eligibility, which is a 
reasonable proxy for DI receipt when the respondent is under 65 years of age. Among 22-64 year old 
respondents, 19 percent of Medicare beneficiaries had substance abuse problems in the previous 12 months 
and/or had received substance abuse treatment. Author’s population-weighted tabulations of the public-use data 
file (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2009). 
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2. Policy Background and Sample Description 
2.1 The Removal of Addictions as Disabling Conditions 
Alcohol and drug addictions became eligible conditions for Social Security Disability 
Insurance (DI) in the 1970s. Those with severe addictions could potentially obtain benefits on 
that basis alone, or addictions could be included as a contributing factor for applicants with 
other disabilities. People receiving benefits because of an addiction were subject to the same 
rules as other DI beneficiaries: they needed to have been in employment covered by Social 
Security for at least five of the previous ten years; medical eligibility was based on 
disabilities that prevented work above “substantial gainful activity” (SGA) levels, a standard 
that is currently just above $1,000 per month; payments were based on beneficiaries’ past 
earnings and a progressive formula that replaces a larger share of the earnings of low wage 
workers; benefits were provided five months after documented disability onset and Medicare 
was provided two years after documented onset. DI beneficiaries with addictions among their 
disabilities, known as “drug addict and alcoholic” (DA&A) beneficiaries, were also required 
to participate in treatment and be paid through responsible agents who could manage their 
money for them (Hunt and Baumohl, 2003; SSA, 2013a).6 
These DA&A DI beneficiaries were subject to the same earnings restrictions as other 
DI beneficiaries, which generally prevent work above SGA levels. In practice, few DI 
beneficiaries work, and their earnings rarely approach SGA levels. In December 2012, for 
example, 0.3 percent of DI beneficiaries had benefits withheld because of substantial work 
(SSA, 2013b). Relative to the overall DI beneficiary population, DA&A beneficiaries did not 
display any greater capacity to work (Hunt and Baumohl, 2003). 
The same medical standards for DI apply to Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a 
federal disability program that provides benefits to disabled individuals with limited assets. It 
provides cash benefits and immediate eligibility for public health insurance through state-
based Medicaid programs. Approximately 28 percent of DI beneficiaries receive SSI at some 
stage, most commonly during the waiting period for DI payments (Rupp and Riley, 2011). 
The majority of the DA&A DI beneficiaries also qualified for SSI, and therefore had access 
to cash and medical benefits while waiting for DI payments (Stapleton et al., 1998). I 
consider whether the employment response differs by SSI status in Sections 3 and 4. 
The number of DI and SSI beneficiaries gaining eligibility because of an alcohol or 
drug addiction grew after reforms in 1984 made it easier to qualify on the basis of multiple 
                                                            
6 Currently, 11 percent of DI beneficiaries have their benefits handled by a responsible third party 
(“representative payees”) (SSA, 2013b).  
  
 
9 
 
disabilities. The number of DA&A beneficiaries increased from approximately 5,000 in 1985 
to 100,000 by early 1993. Like the overall DI beneficiary population, few returned to the 
labor force after entering DI: for example, less than one percent of the DA&A beneficiaries 
entering DI in 1990 had exited because of recovery or medical disqualification by 1994 (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 1994). In response to the growing numbers, 
Congress passed changes in late 1994 to better monitor treatment and introduced a three-year 
time limit on receiving benefits. Numbers continued to grow and, before most of these 
changes had been implemented, legislation was passed on March 29, 1996, removing alcohol 
and drug addictions as eligible conditions.  
This change affected approximately 100,000 DI beneficiaries, which constituted 
around two percent of all DI beneficiaries. These beneficiaries were invited to apply to be 
reclassified on the basis of their other disabilities; those not reclassified would have their DI 
eligibility terminated at the beginning of 1997. Approximately 90 percent applied for 
reclassification, and decisions were made in the latter half of 1996. Around half were 
reclassified and kept receiving DI benefits, while unsuccessful reapplicants and those who 
did not reapply had their benefits terminated on January 1st 1997. A further 110,000 SSI-only 
recipients were also subject to this policy; approximately half of those recipients had their 
benefits terminated (Stapleton et al., 1998; Hunt and Baumohl, 2003). 
There have been several studies of the effects of the DA&A terminations. As 
discussed in the introduction, Campbell et al. (2003), Orwin et al. (2004) and Chatterji and 
Meara (2010) convincingly demonstrate that the terminations led to an increase in 
employment, although lack the necessary statistical power to the employment effects in 
detail. The latter two studies also examine arrest rates, and in both cases the authors find no 
change as a result of the terminations. Chatterji and Meara (2010) also finds that the 
terminations were not associated in any changes in health care usage. Several studies, 
including Campbell et al. (2003), use data from interviews with 1,800 former DA&A SSI 
beneficiaries in nine cities between 1996 and 1998. Podus et al. (2003) finds decreases in the 
utilization of medical and mental health services, while Swartz et al. (2003) finds moderate 
increases in drug-related crime. It difficult to generalize these findings, however, as the 
sample is not nationally representative of former SSI DA&A beneficiaries (Wittenburg et al., 
2003). 
There were claims that the reclassification process was complex and somewhat 
arbitrary. There is evidence that initial DI eligibility decisions do vary across disability 
examiners (Maestas, Mullen and Strand, 2013). Examiners’ judgments were probably even 
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more variable during the reclassification of DA&A beneficiaries, as examiners were required 
to determine how severe an individual’s other disabilities would have been if the beneficiary 
did not have an alcohol or drug addiction. This is especially difficult because there is a lot of 
uncertainty about how substance abuse affects mental disorders (Grant et al., 2004) and 
musculoskeletal conditions (Diamond et al., 1989). There was also a variety of issues related 
to quickly implementing this one-off policy change. In a study commissioned by SSA, 
Stapleton et al. (1998) reported: (1) significant variation across offices in the effort to explain 
the reclassification process to affected beneficiaries; (2) a lack of medical documentation for 
determining eligibility; (3) the use of temporary disability examiners to cope with the 
increased examination workload; (4) claims that the examinations were too brief; and (5) 
claims that some examiners held strong views about substance abuse that influenced their 
decisions. In the next section, I show that terminated and reclassified individuals had similar 
employment histories. The challenges associated with determining who should remain on DI 
and who should be terminated likely contributed to these similarities.  
 
2.2 Data and Sample 
Former DI DA&A beneficiaries were identified using historical extracts of SSA 
administrative data. SSA data systems no longer identify who had been a DA&A beneficiary 
(as the variable is no longer relevant to program management). Fortunately, DA&A records 
were periodically extracted from the Supplemental Security Record, the system used to 
manage SSI, and the March and June 1996 extracts were located for this project. 
Comparisons with Stapleton et al. (1998) indicate that approximately 75 percent of DI 
DA&A beneficiaries can be tracked using the June extract. While the missing beneficiaries 
are presumably those unlikely to have met the SSI asset restrictions, there are DI 
beneficiaries who never received SSI (applicants are sometimes entered into both the DI and 
SSI data systems before eligibility is determined). In Section 4, I separately analyze the 
employment effects for those who only ever received DI, those who had initially received SSI 
and those who continued to receive SSI. 
SSA staff used Social Security numbers in the June 1996 extract to produce up-to-
date extracts of the Supplemental Security Record, Master Beneficiary Record, 831 File and 
Master Earnings File. In combination, these provide a complete history of an individual’s 
receipt of SSA program activity, taxable earnings, impairments, and various demographic 
characteristics, such as sex, age and education. Descriptions of the data and data preparation 
are provided in the online appendix. Information from the 831 File is available from 1989, 
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while the other data is available from 1981 or earlier. All of the datasets track these 
individuals through 2008.  
A sample was created of individuals who were aged 30 to 61 years on January 1st 
1997, the date the terminations took effect. The lower age limit restricts the sample to those 
who were at least 22 years old in 1989, when education and other time-varying information 
were first recorded, while the upper limit removes those eligible for Social Security 
Retirement Insurance at age 62. The sample was also limited to those who first received 
benefits between January 1st 1989 and April 1st 1996, and those receiving DI payments in the 
second quarter of 1996. 
The characteristics of the 51,274 individuals who met these criteria are provided in 
Column 1 of Table 1. Approximately 80 percent of the sample is male. The only information 
on addiction is whether the beneficiary was addicted to alcohol, drugs, or both alcohol and 
drugs. Approximately 58 percent have only an alcohol addiction, 15 percent have only drug 
addictions, and 27 percent have both alcohol and drug addictions. Detailed information about 
the addiction is not available, but Stapleton et al. (1998) reported that the most common drug 
addictions were cocaine and heroin. The most common primary disabilities were alcohol/drug 
addictions (46 percent), mental disorders (22 percent), and musculoskeletal conditions (15 
percent). The average time receiving DI payments before 1997, which includes periods of 
SSI payments if those were received during the DI waiting period, was 2.9 years. The average 
disability benefits paid in 1996 was $10,859. In 1996, males comprised 60 percent of all DI 
beneficiaries and the average age of DI beneficiaries was 49 years, so DA&A DI 
beneficiaries were slightly younger than the general DI beneficiary population and 
disproportionately male (SSA, 1997). 
The sample is divided into those terminated as a result of the policy and those 
reclassified based on other disabilities. Memos to Social Security offices in California 
indicate that disability beneficiaries terminated as a result of this policy should have been 
assigned a disability cessation code in January 1997; these memos are shown in the online 
appendix. Tabulations confirm that these rarely-used codes are used extensively in January 
1997. A person is considered terminated as a result of the policy if, in January 1997, they had 
a newly-assigned cessation code and received no disability payments. A person is considered 
to have been successfully reclassified if, in January 1997, they were in current payment status 
and received disability payments. Approximately nine percent of the sample did not meet 
either definition; these are probably a mix of people who exited for other reasons, had an 
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unusual program status in January 1997, or were terminated as a result of the policy but were 
assigned a rare termination code instead of the right code.7 
The characteristics of terminated and reclassified DI beneficiaries are shown in 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1, respectively. Compared to the reclassified group, terminated 
beneficiaries are younger by an average of 2.7 years and more likely to have had an addiction 
as their primary disability. The termination rate for those with an addiction as their primary 
disability is 52 percent, compared to 31 percent for mental disorders, 34 percent for 
musculoskeletal conditions, and 32 percent for other disabilities. Terminated beneficiaries are 
also relatively more likely to be male, more likely to be black, and less likely to have an 
addiction that was only alcohol. On average, terminated beneficiaries had received disability 
benefits for 4.5 months less than reclassified beneficiaries. All of these differences are 
statistically significant at the five percent level, which is not surprising given the large sample 
size. 
The employment histories of terminated and reclassified beneficiaries are remarkably 
similar. In Figure 2a, I present their average employment rates for the eight years prior to 
applying for DI and for the year of DI application. Employment is based on having wage 
earnings above the annualized threshold for SGA in 1996 ($8,908 in 2013 dollars). This is the 
main employment measure used in the paper, as anyone earning above SGA for a sustained 
period will not be eligible for DI. Over the nine years, the average absolute difference in the 
annual employment rates of terminated and reclassified beneficiaries is 0.7 of a percentage 
point. This is especially small given that employment rates decreased by approximately 50 
percentage points over this period. Despite the large sample sizes, the mean differences are 
statistically significant at the five percent level in only three of the nine years. 
The two groups also have similar trends in average earnings. Figure 2b shows 
terminated and reclassified beneficiaries’ average annual earnings over the same nine-year 
pre-DI period. The average absolute difference in the mean earnings of the two groups is 
$296, or two percent of average earnings over this period. Figure 2b also shows average 
earnings conditional on having earnings above 1996 SGA levels. The average absolute 
difference in conditional mean earnings across the two groups is $604, or two percent of 
average conditional earnings. 
Earnings trends based on calendar years are shown for 1981-2008 in Figure 3a. 
Terminated and reclassified beneficiaries have similar annual earnings trends up to 1996, the 
                                                            
7 As shown in the online appendix, the main results are similar if I assume that those assigned rare codes in 
January 1997 are terminated beneficiaries. 
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year the policy change was announced. This is the case even though there are large declines 
in earnings over this period, as individuals steadily stop working and apply for DI. The 
average earnings difference across the two groups is $709 in 1990, approximately seven 
percent of average earnings for that year. This gap increases by roughly $100 between 1990 
and 1995, while the average earnings of both terminated and reclassified beneficiaries decline 
by approximately $9,000 over the same period.  
As shown in the next section, pre-treatment trends of terminated and reclassified 
beneficiaries become even more similar once controlling for sex-specific age differences. The 
similarity of their pre-DI labor market histories motivates the use of a difference-in-
differences approach to estimate the employment effects of the DI terminations and using 
reclassified beneficiaries as the control group. These similarities are likely due to the unusual 
and complex nature of the reclassification process, where reasonably similar individuals 
received different judgments about their continued DI eligibility. 
A second feature of the mean annual earnings plotted in Figure 3a is the large increase 
in the earnings of terminated beneficiaries from 1996, while there is little change in the 
earnings of reclassified beneficiaries. The difference in the mean earnings of terminated and 
reclassified DI beneficiaries is $4,817 in 1997, peaks at $6,766 in 2000, and declines to 
$3,597 by 2008. The continued interaction between earnings and the disability programs 
helps to explain the decline in terminated beneficiaries’ average earnings after 2000. The 
fractions of terminated and reclassified individuals who received a disability payment before 
and after the end of the DA&A category are shown in Figure 3b. Vertical lines are drawn at 
the end of 1996, when the last pre-termination disability payments were made. Terminated 
beneficiaries steadily re-enter DI or SSI throughout the 1997 to 2008 period, and 52 percent 
of terminated beneficiaries receive post-1996 Social Security payments by 2008.8 As will be 
shown in the next section, the decline in the employment effects after 2000 is mainly due to 
this re-entry, as individuals are again subject to DI work rules and earnings limits.  
 
3. Estimating the Employment Effects 
I estimate the aggregate employment effects due to the termination of disability 
benefits using a difference-in-differences linear probability model, where the employment of 
those who lost their disability benefits is judged relative to those who retained them. Binary 
employment outcomes are used, as we are primarily interested in how the terminations 
                                                            
8 Two percent of terminated beneficiaries first reappear from receiving retirement insurance or old-aged SSI. 
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affected how many individuals were working.9 The main earnings threshold used to define 
employment is the annualized 1996 SGA level, which is equal to $8,908 in 2013 dollars. An 
added benefit of using this level is that it is close to the average DI payments made in 1996, 
and so provides some idea of how many individuals “replaced” their benefits via wage 
earnings. Results using alternative employment thresholds are discussed below. 
Data from 1989 to 2008 are used, which includes seven years of data before the 
terminations were announced (1989-1995), the year that the policy was announced (1996), 
and twelve years after the terminations occurred (1997-2008). Letting yit denote the 
employment outcome for the ith person in the tth year, the equation estimated is: 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߠݐ ൅ ܺ݅ݐߣ ൅ ܶܧܴܯ௜ߚ଴ ൅ ∑ ܦ௧ ∗ ܶܧܴܯ௜ߚ௧ଶ଴଴଼௧ୀଵଽ଼ଽ௧ஷଵଽଽହ ൅ ݑ௜௧  (1) 
The constant is represented by α, and θt is a complete set of time fixed effects that 
capture common annual employment shocks. The vector Xit contains time-varying individual 
characteristics and initially represents two sex-specific cubic functions in age that control for 
age-related changes in employment. The variable TERMi is a dummy variable equal to one if 
an individual had their DI benefits terminated and zero otherwise; it absorbs permanent 
employment differences between terminated and reclassified beneficiaries. Time-varying 
differences between terminated and reclassified beneficiaries are identified by the interaction 
of TERMi with time dummy variables Dt, which are equal to one in year t and zero otherwise. 
The reference year is 1995, the year before the terminations were announced. Terminated 
beneficiaries may have responded to the policy change in 1996 if they decided not to reapply 
or sought work once they found out that their application to be reclassified had been 
unsuccessful. There are 19 βt coefficients of interest that measure the annual differences in 
the probability of employment of terminated and reclassified beneficiaries, relative to 1995. I 
estimate standard errors allowing for heteroskedasticity and an arbitrary correlation in errors 
for each individual.  
The 19 βt coefficients (and 95 percent confidence intervals) measuring the annual 
employment probabilities of terminated beneficiaries relative to reclassified beneficiaries are 
plotted in the gray dashed line in Figure 4. Annual differences in employment during the pre-
treatment period are small, with an annual difference of one percentage point or less between 
1989 and 1994. These coefficients are precisely estimated, with standard errors of 0.5 
                                                            
9 Using earning is also complicated by the large number of observations with zero earnings. Using earnings as 
the dependent variable, which should lead to consistent estimates, leads to similar results to those presented 
using employment outcomes in terms of the similarity of the pre-treatment trends, a large post-termination 
response, and how the treatment effects vary by time spent on DI. These results are provided in the online 
appendix. 
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percentage points or less. In 1996, the year the policy change was announced, the relative 
fraction of terminated beneficiaries who are employed rises to 3.2 percentage points. Once 
disability payments ceased in 1997, the difference increases to 17.8 percentage points. The 
difference in employment probabilities increases to 22.8 percentage points in 1999 and 
remains similar in 2000, then steadily declines to 8.8 percentage points by 2008. All of these 
post-termination employment differences are statistically significant at the one percent level. 
As shown in the black bold line in Figure 4, the coefficients remain similar with the 
addition of more time-invariant controls for demographic characteristics (race, sex, state of 
residence, age at termination); health characteristics (primary disability, addiction type); DI 
program activity (year applied, year started DI, level at which benefits were awarded); and 
work history (the combination of years employed for the five years before applying for DI). 
These controls do not change any of the 19 coefficients of interest by more than 0.4 
percentage points. Both sets of results are presented in tabular form in the online appendix, 
together with similar results that come from a logit specification. 
The employment effects are much higher than suggested by pre-termination exit rates 
among DA&A beneficiaries. As shown in the online appendix, exit rates were similar to the 
overall DI beneficiary population and averaged less than one percent per annum.  The 
employment estimates are similar to recent estimates based on rejected applicants by 
Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2013), who estimate that DI receipt leads to a decrease in 
annual earnings above SGA of 18-19 percentage points two years after the DI allowance 
decision. In addition to being a sample with different characteristics from the overall DI 
beneficiary population, the receipt of DI for some time may have affected the employment 
response. I consider this possibility in Section 5. 
Figure 5 provides more information about the nature and intensity of the employment 
response. In Panel A, I plot the 19 βt coefficients (and 95 percent confidence intervals) from 
equation (1) using a sample that I know definitely applied to be reclassified on the basis of 
their other disabilities. They represent 63 percent of the full sample.10 These coefficients are 
similar to those for the full sample in all years except for 1996, where the employment 
response in this sample is lower than for the overall sample. 
                                                            
10 When individuals apply for DI a record is generated in the 831 File, which is one of the datasets used in this 
study. A new record was only generated in this dataset some of the time during this unusual reclassification 
process, as many reclassified beneficiaries do not have a new record on the 831 File during the reclassification 
period (April to December 1996). This explains why the fraction I can identify as having reapplied is lower than 
the 90 percent estimated by Stapleton et al. (1998). 
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I next present estimates of the employment effects without terminated beneficiaries 
who regained eligibility for a SSA program and without individuals who died in the post-
termination period. These results are shown in Figure 5b. The employment response is larger 
without those who regained eligibility: the peak employment response in 1999 of 30 
percentage points is seven percentage points higher than for the full sample. It is also more 
persistent: the employment response in 2008 is 20 percentage points, compared to eight 
percentage points for the full sample. Mortality also seems to account for some of the decline 
in the employment effects over time. Without those who died or returned to SSA, the 
estimated employment effect is 35 percentage points in 1999 and 26 percentage points in 
2008. These differences are statistically significant at the one percent level. Given that it is 
difficult for SSA to track mortality among non-beneficiaries, the role of mortality is likely to 
be understated in this analysis.11 It is difficult to interpret these patterns, as the re-eligibility 
of terminated beneficiaries may be due to poor health, limited employment prospects, or a 
combination of both. Furthermore, mortality may be affected by the policy change. These 
results are especially helpful, however, in explaining why the earning effects start to dissipate 
four years after the terminations. 
Next, in order to understand the intensity of the employment response, different 
earnings thresholds related to 1996 SGA levels are used to define employment. These results 
are presented in Figure 5c. Halving the threshold to annual earnings above $4,454 results in a 
peak employment response of 27 percentage points in 1999 and a response of 7.6 percentage 
points in 2008. Doubling the threshold to $17,816 results in a peak employment response of 
14.3 percentage points in 2000 and a response of 6.9 percentage points in 2008. Tripling the 
threshold to $26,724 results in a peak employment response of 7.0 percentage points in 2000, 
which declines to 4.2 percentage points by 2008. These results suggest that terminated 
beneficiaries who started working generally earned more than annualized SGA levels, 
although not a lot more. They also indicate that the employment effects are more persistent at 
higher earnings thresholds. 
The results using different earnings thresholds provide some information about the 
quality of employment found by those who lost DI eligibility. Another set of results provide 
more information about this; specifically, how individual’s post-termination earnings 
compare to his or her pre-DI earnings. In Figure 5d, I provide employment results using 
                                                            
11 For non-beneficiaries, the only SSA dataset with date of death is the Numident File. Mortality information in 
the Numident File comes from a wide variety of sources, like funeral homes, hospitals, federal government 
agencies, and state governments. Several government reports, including the SSA Office of Inspector General 
(2012), find that the Numident File misses many deaths. 
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individual-specific thresholds based on each individual’s earnings at two and five years 
before applying for DI. Over the period when the employment effects are largest (1998-
2000), the estimate employment effect is 23 percentage points if employment is defined in 
terms of earnings two years before applying for DI and 18 percentage points if employment is 
defined in terms of earnings five years before applying for DI. In both cases, the declines in 
the employment effects are qualitatively similar to those in the main results.  
Another informative measure is the fraction of terminated beneficiaries that had 
higher earnings after termination than before entering the DI program. In the online appendix, 
I report that 30 percent of terminated beneficiaries had a year of earnings in the post-
termination period (1996-2008) that was higher than in the eight years prior to applying for 
DI. By comparison, approximately six percent of reclassified beneficiaries had their highest 
earnings year in the post-termination period. Among terminated beneficiaries who had at 
least one year of post-termination earnings that was above the 1996 SGA threshold, 53 
percent had their highest earnings year in the post-termination period. Among terminated 
beneficiaries who had earnings above SGA in any year from 2001 to 2004, 61 percent had 
their highest earnings year in the post-termination period, while 66 percent of terminated 
beneficiaries with above-SGA earnings between 2005 and 2008 had their highest earnings 
year in the post-termination period. These fractions suggesting that the employment response 
in Figure 4 mostly represents individuals who earned more after termination than before 
entering DI, especially if they employed several years after the terminations. 
In summary, the results suggest many terminated DI beneficiaries could earn at levels 
that would have disqualified them from the program. The employment effects are large 
relative to these individuals’ work histories, although many terminated beneficiaries do not 
report taxable wage earnings after 1996. Taxable wage earnings are likely to understate 
employment, as Campbell et al. (2003) did find that terminated SSI beneficiaries had 
informal earnings. The decision to reapply did not strongly affect the employment response. 
 
4. Heterogeneity in the Employment Response 
I now examine how the employment effects differed depending on terminated 
beneficiaries’ demographic and health characteristics, as well as their previous earnings and 
other factors that could affect labor force participation. As discussed in the introduction, it 
has been difficult for SSA to target return-to-work policies because there is limited 
information about who is best able to work. 
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The examination of heterogeneity is done by re-estimating equation (1) for different 
subsamples and presenting the 19 coefficients (and 95 percent confidence intervals) that 
measure the employment differences between terminated and reclassified beneficiaries 
relative to 1995. This is done in Figure 6, where the panels provide information about 
whether the employment effects differed by sex; age at termination; earnings prior to DI; 
state unemployment at the time of termination; addiction type; and primary disability. As 
discussed at the end of this section, some additional heterogeneity analysis is also provided in 
the online appendix. 
It is important to separately examine the employment effects for males and female, 
particularly because welfare reform occurred in the late 1990s and affected the options 
available to single mothers. The results for males and females are shows in Figure 6a. The 
employment response for females is higher than for males: on average, the 1998-2000 
coefficients are 1.9 percentage points higher for the female sample than the male sample 
(23.8 vs. 21.9 percentage points), a difference that is statistically significant at the one percent 
level. This difference persists throughout the post-termination period. These differences do 
not necessarily reflect relatively higher work capacity among females, however, as they could 
be explained by their termination rate being lower than for males (42.3 percent vs. 37.4 
percent).12 This is the only case where a difference in the termination rates is at odds with the 
differences in the employment effects; as shown in the online appendix, in the other cases the 
termination rates are either similar across or reinforce any employment differences. 
Younger disabled workers likely experience different health trajectories to older 
disabled workers, and also have different incentives to develop “disability-specific human 
capital” (Charles, 2003). The results for different groups based on age at the start of 1997 are 
shown in Figure 6b. The employment effects decrease with age: the average of the 1998-2000 
coefficients measuring the employment effects is 25.1 percentage points for those aged 30-39 
years, 21.3 percentage points for those aged 40-49 years and 16.2 percentage points for those 
aged 50-61 years. These differences are statistically significant at the one percent level, as are 
the differences later in the post-termination period. The fraction of each age group that has 
their highest earnings year in the post-termination period also decreases with age; this is 
presented in the online appendix. Higher employment rates among younger DI beneficiaries 
                                                            
12 Given the rates at which reclassified beneficiaries work above SGA levels is close to zero, the combined 
fraction of terminated and reclassified beneficiaries who earn above the 1996 SGA threshold during 1998-2000 
is approximately nine percent for both females (employment response of 23.8 percentage points x termination 
rate of 37.4 percent) and males (employment response of 21.9 percentage points x termination rate of 42.3 
percent). 
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is consistent with employment estimates from studies of rejected DI applicants (e.g., von 
Wachter et al., 2011) and of current DI beneficiaries (e.g., Kostol and Mogstad, 2014). 
Individuals whose labor force attachment was relatively high before applying for DI 
may be able to return to the workforce more easily than other terminated beneficiaries. To 
examine whether this was the case, I divide the sample into three groups based on average 
annual earnings in the 3-5 years before applying for DI:13 those with average earnings that are 
above the 1996 SGA threshold, those with average earnings that are between half and one of 
the threshold, and those with average earnings that are less than half of the threshold. Results 
for these groups are presented in Figure 6c. Higher pre-DI earnings are associated with larger 
employment effects: the average of the 1998-2000 coefficients is 26.0 percentage points for 
those with average pre-DI earnings above the 1996 SGA threshold, 21.4 percentage points for 
those with average pre-DI earnings between half and one of 1996 SGA, and 16.8 percentage 
points for those with average pre-DI earnings of half 1996 SGA or less. These differences are 
statistically significant at the one percent level and persist throughout the post-termination 
period. Despite this, only 23 percent of terminated beneficiaries with above-SGA pre-DI 
earnings had their highest earnings year in the post-termination period, compared to 36 
percent for the group with average pre-DI earnings 0.5-1 of SGA and 37 percent for the 
group with average pre-DI earnings less than half of the SGA threshold. 
I next examine there were differences by local labor market conditions, as they have 
been found to affect entry into DI (Autor and Duggan, 2003) and how current DI 
beneficiaries respond to changing work incentives (Kostol and Mogstad, 2014). Average 
state-level unemployment rates in 1997 and 1998 are used to create three subsamples: those 
living in states where unemployment averaged less than 4.5 percent (“low unemployment”), 
those living where average unemployment was between 4.5 percent and 5.5 percent (“mid 
unemployment”); and those living where unemployment was above 5.5 percent (“high 
unemployment”). The employment effects for these three groups are shown in Figure 6d. The 
average employment response across the peak years of 1998-2000 is 11-12 percent smaller in 
the high unemployment sample than in the other two groups, a difference that is statistically 
significant at the one percent level. This effect declines in the later years; beyond 2001, the 
relative employment of terminated beneficiaries in the high unemployment group is actually 
higher than in the other two groups beyond 2001. As shown in the online appendix, there are 
                                                            
13 This is the definition used by Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2013). 
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not noticeable differences in the fraction of each group that records their highest earnings in 
the post-termination years. 
The final two panels of Figure 6 provide results by type of addiction (Panel E) and 
primary disability (Panel F). Even though there are differences, the results by addiction type 
do not suggest a consistent difference between alcohol-vs.-drug addictions because there are 
small and statistically insignificant differences between the employment responses of the 
“alcohol only” and “drug only” groups during the first seven years after the terminations were 
announced. The employment response is relatively higher in the drug-only subsample beyond 
that, although that may be because they are younger (average age of 41.0 years ) than the 
alcohol-only group (average age of 44.9 years).The results for the different disability-based 
subgroups, which are shown in Panel F, demonstrate that the employment response is similar 
for those with alcohol/drug addictions, mental disorders, and musculoskeletal conditions as 
their primary disability. Those with other physical disabilities have an employment response 
that is approximately 25 percent lower than the other three groups during the first few years 
after the terminations, and their employment remains relatively low throughout the sample 
period.  
In the online appendix, I provide further results by race, educational attainment and 
the DI beneficiaries’ involvement in the SSI program. Even when there are differences in the 
employment response that are statistically statistic at conventional levels, they are neither 
large in magnitude nor persistent throughout the sample period. 
 
5. The Role of Time Spent Receiving Disability Benefits 
I now examine how the employment effects differ by the time spent on DI. 
Individuals had entered the DI program at different points in time, and therefore had received 
disability benefits for different lengths of time to prior to the terminations. As discussed in 
the introduction, there is lack of evidence on how work capacity changes while on DI.  
It is important to recognize that, because the terminations occurred at the same time, 
an individual’s DI duration is correlated with when they applied for DI. This creates the 
potential for any pre-existing differences across beneficiary cohorts to be attributed to the 
role of time on DI. The first step in addressing this concern is to assess whether there were 
pre-existing differences in the employment and health characteristics of DI DA&A 
beneficiaries. In order to assess pre-existing employment differences, in Figure 7a I present 
the fraction of each cohort that earned more than the 1996 SGA threshold two years and five 
years before applying for DI, where the cohorts had between less than one year on DI and six 
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years on DI before the terminations took effect.14 The employment rates are similar across the 
cohorts: the fraction employed five years before applying for DI is between 41 and 48 percent 
and the fraction employed two years before applying for DI is between 19 and 24 percent. 
Furthermore, there is not a consistent pattern in the differences: those on DI for one year had 
the highest fraction employed using the five-year pre-DI measure, while those on DI for five 
years had the highest fraction employed using the two-year pre-DI measure. 
The cohorts also look similar in terms of their initial health, as measured by average 
mortality rates during the first year on DI. This is shown in Figure 7b. The overall average 
mortality rate in the first year of DI receipt is 2.4 percent, and each year of DI entrants have 
an average mortality rate that is within 0.3 percentage points of that value. In combination, 
these figures show that time on DI is not strongly correlated with initial measurements of 
health and work capacity. The potential influence of pre-DI differences is considered further 
after I estimate the role of time on DI.  
So far, the employment effects have been allowed to vary each year in the post-
termination period. Now, in order to make it easier to examine how the employment effects 
differ by time on DI, I impose a functional form on the post-termination employment 
response. The results presented so far show that the employment effects generally follow a 
similar pattern: the relative employment of terminated beneficiaries rises in 1996 and 1997; is 
highest from 1998 to 2000; and declines from 2000 to 2008. Given this, I adapt equation (1) 
by replacing the interactions between TERMi and the post-1997 year dummy variables with 
two variables: SHIFTit is equal to one if t ≥ 1998 and the individual is a terminated 
beneficiary, and zero otherwise; and DECLINEit = t – 1999 if t ≥ 2000 and the individual is a 
terminated beneficiary, and zero otherwise.15 The dummy variables for the years 1996 and 
1997 are retained, as are the dummy variables for the years 1989 to 1994. The regression 
specification now becomes: 
 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ߣ ൅ ܶܧܴܯ௜ߚ଴ ൅ ∑ ܦ௧ ∗ ܶܧܴܯ௜ߚ௧ଵଽଽ଻௧ୀଵଽ଼ଽ௧ஷଵଽଽହ ൅	ܵܪܫܨ ௜ܶ௧ߜଵ ൅	ܦܧܥܮܫܰܧ௜௧ߜଶ ൅ ݑ௜௧   
(2) 
                                                            
14 For this exercise, annual earnings are converted into 2013 dollars using the National Wage Index, which 
measures the average changes in wages in the United States and so takes account of wage growth.  
15 Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) imposed a functional form on the post-policy changes in earnings of 
displaced workers to get a better idea of the evolution of the differences across demographic groups. von 
Wachter, Song and Manchester (2011) uses a similar approach. I tested plausible alternative specifications, such 
as estimating DECLINEit starting from 1999 or 2001. The differences across groups are similar in these alternate 
regressions. 
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The main coefficients of interest are now δ1, which measures the post-termination 
employment effects across 1998 to 2000, and δ2, which measures the trend in the 
employment effects from 2000 to 2008.16 The estimates for these two coefficients are 
presented in Column 1 of Table 2. The SHIFTit coefficient is 22.0 percentage points, close to 
the peak employment response using the more flexible specification. The DECLINEit 
coefficient is -1.6 percentage points, reflecting the annual decline in the employment effects 
from 2000 to 2008. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level. The 
average of the six coefficients resulting from the interactions between TERMi and the 1989-
1994 dummy variables is 0.3 percentage points, with a standard error of 0.3 percentage 
points, which shows that terminated and reclassified beneficiaries have similar pre-treatment 
employment trends in this specification. As shown in the online appendix, the estimated 
coefficients on SHIFTit and DECLINEit are similar in plausible alternative specifications, 
such as allowing DECLINEit to start in 1999 or in 2001.  
Equation (2) is then adapted to allow the employment effects to vary by time on 
disability benefits, DI_TIMEi, which is the length of time between the month when an 
individual first received benefits and when the terminations occurred in January 1997. Square 
and cubic terms of DI_TIMEi are used to allow the employment effects to vary nonlinearly 
with time on DI. These three variables are interacted with all of the variables identifying 
employment differences between terminated and reclassified beneficiaries throughout the 
sample period. That is, 
 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ߣ ൅ ܶܧܴܯ݅ߚ0 ൅ ܼ௜௧߮଴ ൅ ܦܫ_ܶܫܯܧ௜ ∗ ܼ௜௧߮ଵ 
൅ܦܫ_ܶܫܯܧ௜ଶ ∗ ܼ௜௧߮ଶ ൅ ܦܫ_ܶܫܯܧ௜ଷ ∗ ܼ௜௧߮ଷ ൅ ݑ௜௧    (3) 
 
 
Where ܼ௜௧߮ሺ௡ሻ ൌ ∑ ܦ௧ ∗ ܶܧܴܯ௜ߚሺ௡ሻ௧ଵଽଽ଻௧ୀଵଽ଼ଽ௧ஷଵଽଽହ ൅	ܵܪܫܨ ௜ܶ௧ߜሺ௡ሻଵ ൅	ܦܧܥܮܫܰܧ௧ߜሺ௡ሻଶ. 
 
In addition to the coefficients on SHIFTit and DECLINEit, the primary coefficients of 
interest are those resulting from the interactions between SHIFTit and DECLINEit and the 
three cubic terms of DI_TIMEi. Estimates of these eight coefficients for the full sample are 
presented in Column 2 of Table 2. The coefficient (standard error) on SHIFTit is 0.069 
(0.022), which can be interpreted as the estimated employment effect before receiving any 
disability benefits. All three coefficients from the interactions between SHIFTit and the 
DI_TIMEi terms are statistically significant at the one percent level, suggesting the increase 
in post-termination employment varies nonlinearly with DI receipt. In contrast, the three 
                                                            
16 Differences across groups in the 1996 and 1997 coefficients are hard to interpret, as they may reflect timing 
differences of the reclassification process rather than just differences in the timing of the employment response. 
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coefficients from the interactions between DECLINEit and the DI_TIMEi terms are not jointly 
significant at the five percent level.  
Together, these results suggest that the time on disability benefits affected the number 
of terminated beneficiaries who became employed but not the subsequent decline in the 
employment effects. For this reason, I focus on how the maximum employment response 
varies as a function of time on DI by calculating the nonlinear combination of the four 
coefficients related to the SHIFTit variable at different values of DI_TIMEi, and calculating 
standard errors using the delta method. This is plotted in Figure 7c for values of DI_TIMEi 
between nine months, which is the shortest period of DI receipt in this sample, and six years, 
beyond which the confidence intervals become wide and uninformative.  There is an 
inverted-U relationship between the employment effects and time spent on DI. For those who 
received DI for nine months, the maximum employment response is estimated to be 16.3 
percentage points. The maximum employment response then increases with DI receipt up to 
2.7 years of time on DI, when the total shift in employment peaks at 24.6 percentage points, 
or 50 percent higher than those on DI for nine months. The employment effects are smaller 
for those who received DI for longer than 2.7 years, and the maximum employment response 
is 18.8 percentage points for terminated beneficiaries who were on DI for six years. The 95 
percent confidence intervals show these differences to be statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Given the evidence that capacity to work generally declines with time 
out of the labor force, it is surprising that the employment effects are initially increasing with 
time on DI. I conduct a number of additional exercises to understand the source of these 
differences.  
In order to understand whether this pattern is concentrated among a particular 
disability type, results for the four disability-based groups used previously (alcohol/drug 
addictions, mental disorders, musculoskeletal, and other physical conditions) are presented in 
the online appendix. An inverted-U relationship between the employment effects and time on 
DI is present in all groups except for those with non-musculoskeletal physical conditions as 
their primary disability.  
Next, I further assess the potential role of compositional differences in explaining the 
inverted-U relationship by estimating the relationship between time on DI and the 
employment effects for different age groups. As shown in the online appendix, few DA&A 
beneficiaries exited DI prior to the terminations: exit due to recovery was less than one 
percent per year and exit due to mortality was 2-3 percent per annum. Nevertheless, if the 
employment effects are increasing with time on DI because of attrition, then it should operate 
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through mortality rather than recovery (i.e., after two or three years on DI, those who are sick 
and likely to have low work capacity would have died and left a healthier and more able 
group). These differences should therefore be more pronounced among older beneficiaries, 
due to their relatively higher mortality rate. The regression results for those aged 30-39, 40-
49, and 50-61 years at termination are presented in Columns 3-5 of Table 2 and in Figure 7d. 
The inverted-U pattern is strongest among the youngest group, further suggesting that the 
inverted-U relationship is not due to pre-existing differences between beneficiaries. It also 
remains in additional exercises aimed at limiting the role of beneficiary cohort effects, which 
are presented in the online appendix.17  
Additional training while on DI is also not a plausible explanation. There is no 
evidence of vocational training in Stapleton et al. (1998) or any other report, and the mean 
years of education reported during the reclassification process in 1996 is the same as the 
mean years of education reported when applying for DI (in both cases, the average is 11.0 
years). There are also not differences in termination rates that could explain the 
relationship.18  
 
5.1 Differences by Initial Health 
One possible explanation for the larger employment effects after 2.5–3 years of DI 
receipt is that health improvement initially dominates any negative effects of being out of the 
labor force. While the SSA administrative data do not contain direct measures of individuals’ 
health status, there is information about how easily individuals gained eligibility for disability 
benefits that can serve as a measure of initial health. Hu et al. (2001) finds that individuals 
judged to be disabled at earlier stages of the DI determination process have, on average, more 
severe disabilities than those awarded eligibility at later stages. Such health differences do 
seem to affect employment. von Wachter et al. (2011) estimates that, prior to receiving DI, 
                                                            
17 First, given that some of the observable characteristics of DA&A beneficiaries changed as the program grew, 
to further rule out compositional effects equation (4) is estimated for subsamples based on those changing 
characteristics (which are sex, race and addiction type). Second, given changes to the DA&A program were 
passed in August 1994 and implemented between March 1995 and March 1996, the regression is estimated 
without individuals applying in August 1994 and later. An inverted-U relationship is also present in these 
analyses. These results are available in the online appendix. 
18 The termination rate is 47 percent for those on DI for a year or less, 47 percent for those on DI for 13-24 
months, and 43 percent for 25-36 months. Differences across beneficiary cohorts are primarily a function of age: 
in a linear probability model where termination is used as the dependent variable and age controls are used, 
coefficients on dummy variables measuring time on DI suggest that time on DI only predicts termination for 
those with more than three years of DI receipt (when probability of termination is slowly decreasing with time 
on DI). 
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those awarded eligibility at earlier stages are less able to work than those awarded DI at later 
stages. 
Information from the 831 File can be used to identify those awarded eligibility at 
three stages: (1) after their initial determination by medical examiners in state-level Disability 
Determination Services (DDS) offices; (2) after reconsideration by a different set of DDS 
disability examiners; and (3) by an Administrative Law Judge or at a higher-level hearing.19 
In this sample, 44 percent were awarded DI at the initial stage, 11 percent were awarded DI 
after reconsideration, and 45 percent were awarded DI at the hearings level. 
Equation (3) is used to estimate the role of time on DI in the “Initial Award” and 
“Hearings Award” groups. These results are presented in Columns 6-7 of Table 2 and Figure 
7e. The coefficient (standard error) on SHIFTit for Initial Award group is 0.003 (0.032), 
compared to 0.117 (0.037) for the Hearings Award group. This suggests that employment 
prior to DI would have been higher for those awarded eligibility at later stages, which is 
consistent with von Wachter, Song and Manchester (2011). Figure 7e shows that the 
employment effects are also larger at nine months of DI receipt for the Hearings Award 
group than the Initial Award group, a difference that is statistically significant at the one 
percent level. However, the employment effects rise with DI receipt at a faster rate in the 
Initial Award group than in the Hearings Award group, so much so that the peak employment 
response for the Initial Award group is two percentage points higher than the peak for the 
Hearings Award group. DA&A termination rates further support health improvement being 
behind these patterns; they are higher for initial awardees (44 percent) than hearings 
awardees (31 percent). Those most readily defined as disabled when they applied for DI were 
least likely to be defined as disabled when reassessed some time later. 
These differences suggest that the most clearly disabled individuals at the time of 
application improved the most, so much so that their employment is higher than those 
initially denied benefits after a period of benefit receipt. This could be due to the effects of 
the program or mean reversion in health, as those in the poorest health when applying for DI 
may have suffered from the largest health shocks. Initial access to Medicaid does not seem to 
account for the pattern: as shown in the online appendix, the inverted-U pattern is present 
among DI beneficiaries with initial access to SSI who were eligible for Medicaid, and also 
among DI beneficiaries who had to wait for Medicare eligibility for access to public health 
                                                            
19 Applicants denied at the DDS level can request a hearing with an Administrative Law Judge, and then appeal 
to the Social Security Appeals Council, to the U.S. District Court, and finally to the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Around one third of DI awards are made through one of these ways, with nearly all of them made by 
Administrative Law Judges (SSA, 2012a).  
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insurance. It is not possible to further distinguish the role of Medicare from other aspects of 
the program. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Reducing the fiscal burden associated with disability insurance requires policies that 
decrease the inflow into these programs, increase the outflow, or decrease the generosity of 
the benefits provided. Understanding the employment implications of different policies 
requires knowledge of disabled workers’ ability to work before, during and after the receipt 
of DI. Direct evidence is particularly important in this context, as DI applicants and 
beneficiaries have incentives to understate their true work capacity in order to gain or 
maintain their program eligibility. The widespread loss of DI eligibility studied here provides 
a rare opportunity to understand how work capacity does change by observing the work 
activity of disabled individuals once they no longer receive benefits. Approximately 22 
percent of terminated beneficiaries started working at levels above “substantial gainful 
activity” earnings standard used by SSA to judge eligibility for DI. This level of labor force 
re-attachment is large relative to their work histories, and especially surprising given that they 
received no formal vocational support to help them re-enter the labor force (Stapleton et al., 
1998). It is also well above the levels suggested by the exit rate from DI due to medical 
recovery, which was less than one percent per annum. The employment response declines 
over time, largely through terminated beneficiaries requalifying for DI or social insurance 
programs managed by SSA. 
There is substantial heterogeneity in the employment response, with age and prior 
earnings strongly related to the magnitude of the employment response. In addition, there is 
heterogeneity in the employment response by time on DI, with the largest employment 
response among terminated beneficiaries who had received DI for 2.5-3 years prior to the 
terminations. There is suggestive evidence that changing health may account for some of this 
pattern, although more needs to be done to establish the mechanisms underlying the role of 
DI duration.   
While there is a possible interaction between cash payments and addiction, the fact 
that the estimates are similar across individuals addicted to alcohol and to drugs suggests that 
the response did not result from a strong interaction between substance abuse and disability 
payments, as the cash required to sustain a heavy alcohol addiction is very different to heavy 
heroin or cocaine addictions (Rhodes et al., 2000). Moreover, the similarity of the 
employment effects across those with addictions, mental disorders and musculoskeletal 
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conditions as their primary disability suggests that there are large and identifiable groups of 
current beneficiaries for whom the findings are likely to be informative.  
The findings suggest ways in which current return-to-work initiatives may be made 
more effective in the United States and elsewhere. DI beneficiaries are currently scheduled to 
have medical reassessments (called “continuing disability reviews”) every one, three or seven 
years, depending on the severity and likely improvement of their disability. In order to deal 
with resource constraints and backlogs, many of these reviews are either waived or done in 
the form of a mailer that contains six questions about recent health work and training. 
Responses to this mailer generate a full reassessment in 2.5 percent of cases, while the full 
reassessments themselves generate terminations in approximately three percent of cases 
(SSA, 2012). While there is some profiling in terms of who is sent a mailer and who is 
subject to a full reassessment, the findings here suggest a more focused role for medical 
reassessments. For example, comprehensive reassessments after two or three years of benefit 
receipt may have better chances of terminations than earlier and later reviews and be a 
sensible way to allocate scarce resources.  
A relationship between time receiving disability benefits and capacity to work has 
important implications for interpreting studies that use the earnings histories of rejected 
applicants to estimate the likely employment of those who successfully become beneficiaries 
(e.g., Bound, 1989; von Wachter et al., 2011; Maestas et al., 2013). While these studies 
provide precise estimates of the employment potential of accepted applicants at the point they 
are applying for DI, the dynamic effects identified here suggest we should be cautious about 
using that design to identify the potential employment of all disability beneficiaries. 
The findings also speak to fundamental questions about how disability insurance 
programs might be reformed. Most are structured as permanent disability programs. This puts 
the onus on examiners performing the medical reassessments to show beneficiaries no longer 
meet the eligibility standard, which creates legal and political issues that may explain why 
relatively few individuals ever lose eligibility. Likewise, the low take-up of vocational 
support likely reflects the risks involved in giving up a relatively certain stream of disability 
benefits (Autor and Duggan, 2003). The employment effects identified here suggest that 
providing public assistance through an acute period of poor health may be an effective way to 
maximize labor force participation of some disabled individuals. 
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Table 1 Characteristics of Sample at the Time of Program Termination 
 All Terminated Reclassified 
 (1) (2) (3) 
   
Demographics    
Male 80% 82% 78% 
Female 20% 18% 22% 
    
White 58% 52% 62% 
Black 33% 39% 29% 
Other race 7.8% 8.0% 7.6% 
    
Age in Jan 1997 (years) 
  (Std. dev.) 
43.4 
(7.62) 
41.9 
(6.90) 
44.6 
(7.93) 
    
Educational attainment (years) 
  (Std. dev.) 
11.0 
(2.03) 
11.1 
(1.92) 
11.0 
(2.10) 
    
Type of addiction    
Alcohol only 58% 54% 62% 
Alcohol and drugs 27% 30% 24% 
Drugs only 15% 16% 14% 
    
Primary disability when applying    
Alcohol/drug addiction 46% 58% 38% 
Mental disorders 22% 16% 26% 
Musculoskeletal condition 15% 13% 17% 
Other disabilities  17% 13% 19% 
Neurological condition 2.6% 2.1% 2.9% 
Digestive condition 2.3% 1.6% 2.6% 
Respiratory 1.9% 1.3% 2.4% 
Other disabilities 7.1% 6.3% 8.1% 
    
DI program involvement    
Time on disability benefits (years)  
  (Std. dev.) 
2.92 
(1.62) 
2.74 
(1.57) 
3.13 
(1.66) 
    
1996 federal benefits (2013 dollars) 
  (Std. dev.) 
$10,859 
(3,163) 
$10,625 
(3,052) 
$11,111 
(3,220) 
    
Observations 51,274 19,229 27,296 
  
Notes: There are 4,749 individuals who could not be classified as having kept or lost benefits as a result 
of the policy; these individuals are not included in either group. Race is missing or inconsistent for 1.6 
percent of the sample, and education is missing for 6.1 percent; these fractions are similar across the 
terminated and reclassified groups. Payments in 1996 are converted to 2013 dollars. 
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Table 2 Regression Estimates of the Employment Effects by Time on DI 
   Age at termination Stage of award 
 All All 30-39 40-49 50-61 Initial Hearings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   
        
(a) SHIFTit 0.220*** 0.069*** 0.041 0.055* 0.123** 0.003 0.117***
 (0.003) (0.022) (0.037) (0.033) (0.054) (0.032) (0.037) 
(b) SHIFTit x DI_TIMEi  0.155*** 0.237*** 0.148*** 0.004 0.209*** 0.129***
     (0.024) (0.041) (0.034) (0.057) (0.033) (0.042) 
(c) SHIFTit x DI_TIMEi2  -0.042*** -0.072*** -0.037*** 0.005 -0.053*** -0.043***
     (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014) 
(d) SHIFTit x DI_TIMEi3  0.0033*** 0.006*** 0.003*** -0.001 0.004*** 0.004***
     (0.0006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
(e) DECLINEit -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.010** 
 (0.0004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
(f) DECLINEit x DI_TIMEi  -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.002 -0.007 
     (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
(g) DECLINEit x DI_TIMEi2  0.0006 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 0.002 
     (0.0008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0011) (0.002) 
(h) DECLINEit x DI_TIMEi3  -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.00003 -0.0002 
     (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00009) (0.0001) 
        
p-value on joint test that 
DI_TIMEi affects SHIFTit  
[i.e., (b)=(c)=(d)] 
 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.10 <0.01 <0.01 
p-value on joint test that 
DI_TIMEi affects DECLINEit 
[i.e., (f)=(g)=(h)] 
 0.50 0.84 0.44 0.72 0.43 0.28 
        
R-squared 0.347 0.358 0.348 0.360 0.355 0.356 0.359 
Observations 930,500 930,500 314,020 403,960 212,520 406,220 418,700 
   
Notes: ** denotes p<0.05, *** denotes p<0.01.Employment is defined as earning more than 1996 SGA ($8,908).  
For terminated beneficiaries, the dummy variable SHIFTit equals one for years t ≥ 1998, while DECLINEit is a 
dummy variable that equals t – 1999 for years t ≥ 2000. The variable DI_TIMEi measures the months on DI prior 
to January 1997. Other covariates include a binary variable identifying terminated beneficiaries, a full set of year 
dummy variables, the interaction of these variables for years 1989-1994 and 1996-1997, sex-specific cubic 
functions in age, and controls for individuals’ demographic, health, program history and work history 
characteristics. The reference year is 1995. Standard errors are in parentheses and allow for within-person 
correlation in errors. 
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A1. Data Sources 
Six extracts of Social Security Administration datasets are used for this project: (1) the 
Supplemental Security Record – DA&A Extract; (2) the Supplemental Security Record – 
Longitudinal File; (3) the Master Beneficiary Record – 810 File; (4) the Disability Master File 
(831 File); (5) the Numident File; and (6) the Master Earnings File. More details about each of 
these datasets are provided here, including additional references for those wanting more 
information. 
The Supplemental Security Record – DA&A Extracts are from the Supplemental Security 
Record, the system used to manage the SSI program, and include information on all recipients 
identified as having alcohol or drug addictions. These extracts were produced every three months 
in 1996, and the March and June 1996 extracts were obtained for this project. They provide 
snapshots of recent program activity and have been used by Barber (1996), Stapleton et al. 
(1998), and Waid and Barber (2001) to count and describe DA&A beneficiaries. 
The Supplemental Security Record – Longitudinal File (SSR) and Master Beneficiary 
Record – 810 File (MBR) provide details of individuals’ program history for, respectively, SSI 
and DI. The MBR also provides information on an individual’s usage of Retirement and 
Survivor’s Insurance. Both files include information on each individual’s monthly program 
status and the federal payments due. A description of the SSR is provided by Pickett and Scott 
(1996), and documentation on both datasets is provided by the data linkage projects of SSA and 
the National Center for Health Statistics. 
The Disability Master File / 831 File includes details about medical disability 
determinations; the “831” name refers to the form from which much of the information comes. A 
record is generated whenever an initial determination is made by state-level Disability 
Determination Services (DDS), and additional records are generated for subsequent decisions, 
corrections, and reviews conducted by DDS offices. Higher-level decisions, such as those made 
by Administrative Law Judges, are handled by a different part of SSA and are normally missing 
from the 831 File.  Chen and van der Klaauw (2006) provide some details about the variables 
listed in the 831 File. Consistent extracts of the 831 File are available from 1989 and education 
information is reliable from 1992. Given that most DA&A beneficiaries applied after 1991 and 
most applied to be re-classified in 1996, education is available for nearly the whole sample. 
A3 
 
The Numident File contains the records of all individuals who have applied for Social 
Security cards, and is updated whenever changes are made to Social Security cards and when 
deaths are reported to SSA. It includes information on individuals’ date and place of birth. 
The Master Earnings File contains earnings data used to calculate amounts for SSA 
benefit payments which comes from employers and the Internal Revenue Service. The extract 
used for this project lists annual wage (W-2) and self-employment earnings for individuals from 
1978 to 2008. Olsen and Hudson (2009) provide an overview of the Master Earnings File, while 
Kopscuk, Saez and Song (2009) provide additional information about the quality of these data. 
There is a Social Security earnings cap above which earnings do not affect Social Security 
calculations, and the key issue with these data is the quality of earnings data above this cap. SSA 
retained information on uncapped W-2 earnings for the first time in 1978, and Kopczuk et al. 
(2009) find these data to be reliable from 1981. Self-employment earnings are not used as they 
are less reliable and were effectively top-coded at the taxable maximum until 1993 (when the cap 
on the Medicare tax was eliminated) (Olsen and Hudson, 2009). 
 
A2. Main Data Issues 
Data Cleaning. Records with missing sex, date of birth and state of residence information 
are excluded. Addiction information was missing in around eight percent of cases. These cases 
were omitted, as it was not completely clear whether this group included some beneficiaries 
whose drug and alcohol addiction was not material in their original application for disability 
benefits. A small number of values in the Master Earnings File were unusually large, were 
inconsistent with SSA program usage, and were obviously reporting errors. To remove these 
errors, 65 individuals who had W-2 earnings that would have put them in the top one percent of 
households in terms of income were removed; these earnings levels are taken from Piketty and 
Saez (2003) and updates that Saez provides on his website (http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/). 
Sample Restrictions. The key sample restrictions are mentioned in the text: (1) 
individuals aged between 30 and 61 years of age at the beginning of 1997; (2) who started to 
receive payments between 1st January 1989 and 1st April 1996; (3) who were in current payment 
status in the second quarter of 1996 (to remove individuals who had died or left the program 
before the end of the DA&A program was announced); (4) and who were due at least half of the 
standard SSI payment in the second quarter of 1996, which is also the minimum payment for 
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most DI beneficiaries and is used to remove individuals in unusual payment situations (e.g., who 
were repaying large DI overpayments). 
Note that these restrictions do not exclude individuals who responded to the policy 
change prior to termination of benefits in January 1997. Individuals earning at levels that 
reduced their disability benefits or who no longer adhered to DI program conditions in the 
second half of 1996 were still included in the sample. Around three percent of the sample had 
program status codes in the second half of 1996 that indicated they were earning at levels that 
limited the disability benefits they received. These individuals were generally assigned program 
codes in January 1997 that indicated they had been terminated as a result of the policy change. 
Identifying Terminated and Reclassified Beneficiaries. I identify terminated and 
reclassified beneficiaries using payment information and program status codes. A person is 
considered to have been reclassified if, in January 1997, he or she received DI payments and was 
in current payment status. A person is considered to have been terminated as a result of the 
policy if, in January 1997, he or she was due no payments and had a “disability cessation” 
program status code (the relevant program status codes are N07 in the SSR and T8 in the MBR). 
This was in line with the memorandum below. This code is rarely assigned; tabulations of the 
raw Master Beneficiary Record file show that there were 23,295 individuals assigned the 
disability cessation code in January 1997, compared to a monthly average of 53 people 
throughout 1996.  Therefore the terminated group should include very few individuals who 
would have been assigned this code because of disability cessation unrelated to the policy 
change. 
 Approximately nine percent of the sample is neither clearly reclassified nor terminated as 
a result of the policy. This group is probably a mix of reclassified beneficiaries with an unusual 
payment status in January 1997, individuals losing benefits for reasons unrelated to the policy 
change, or terminated beneficiaries who were assigned a rare termination code instead of the T8 
code. The use of rare codes does increase in January 1997, suggesting some staff may have been 
unclear on the correct administrative procedures for this one-off policy change. Counting these 
individuals as terminated leads to similar estimates to those presented in the paper, as shown in 
Section A6 of this appendix. 
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A3. Estimating the Employment Effects using Different Controls and Specifications 
In Figure 4 of the paper I show estimates of terminated beneficiaries’ annual probabilities 
of employment relative to reclassified beneficiaries using the linear probability model described 
by equation (1). In this section, these results are provided in tabular form, together with results 
using different controls and a logit specification.  
Table A1 shows, using different specifications, the β0 coefficient on the dummy variable 
identifying permanent differences in employment between terminated and reclassified 
beneficiaries and the 19 βt coefficients that measure the annual differences in the probability of 
employment of terminated and reclassified beneficiaries, relative to 1995 (the year before the 
policy change was announced). The first set of coefficients, presented in Column 1, comes from 
a specification where the vector of time-varying individual characteristics Xit includes two sex-
specific cubic functions in age. In the paper, these coefficients are shown in the dashed line in 
Figure 4 (labeled “initial model”).  
The results from adding more time-invariant individual characteristics to the regression 
are presented in Columns 2 to 5 of Table A1. In turn, I add controls for individuals’ demographic 
characteristics (race, sex, state of residence, age at termination); health characteristics (primary 
disability, addiction type); their DI program activity (year applied, year started DI, level at which 
benefits were awarded); and their work history (combination of years employed for the five years 
before applying for DI). The coefficients in Column 5 of Table A1 are shown by a bold line in 
Figure 4 in the paper (labeled “with extra controls”).  
In a difference-in-differences context, the advantage of the linear probability model 
relative to a logit or probit model is that common unobservable trends between treated and 
comparison groups are differenced out. However, these alternative models better approximate 
the statistical properties of a binary variable, so I analyze the employment effects with a logit 
specification of the following form: 
ܲሾݕ௜௧ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ሺ ௜ܹ௧ߛሻ/ሾ1 ൅ ݁ݔ݌ሺ ௜ܹ௧ߛሻሿ     (A1) 
 
Where  ܹ ௜௧ߛ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ߣ ൅ ܶܧܴܯ௜ߚ଴ ൅ ∑ ܦ௧ ∗ ܶܧܴܯ௜ߚ௧ଶ଴଴଼௧ୀଵଽ଼ଽ௧ஷଵଽଽହ . 
The notation is similar to the linear probability model, which is given by equation (1) in 
the paper: the dummy variable yit is equal to one if earnings are above the 1996 annualized SGA 
level; the constant is represented by α; a complete set of time fixed effects is represented by θt; 
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the vector Xit represents time-varying individual characteristics and includes two sex-specific 
cubic functions in age; the dummy variable identifying terminated beneficiaries is represented by 
TERMi; and time-varying differences between terminated and reclassified beneficiaries are 
identified by the interaction of TERMi with time dummy variables Dt. As with the linear 
probability model, the reference year is 1995 and standard errors are estimated allowing for 
heteroskedasticity and an arbitrary correlation in errors at the individual level. The coefficients 
are expressed as marginal effects using the double differences in the estimated probabilities 
when each dummy variable equals one as compared to when it is zero (Ai and Norton, 2003). 
Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. 
The logit results are presented in Column 6 of Table A1, and are most directly 
comparable to the Column 1 results. The results are similar across the two columns: the annual 
employment differences are generally one percentage point or less in the pre-treatment period of 
1989 to 1994; the relative employment of terminated beneficiaries’ rises once the terminations 
occurred and peaks at 22.8 percentage points in 1999 (in both the logit and linear probability 
model specifications); and the employment differences then decline to 8.8 percentage points in 
2008. In the logit analysis, the standard error of each coefficient is 0.4 percentage points or less. 
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Table A1 Estimates of Terminated Beneficiaries’ Relative Probabilities of Employment 
Based on Annual Earnings > 1996 Substantial Gainful Activity ($8,908 in 2013 Dollars)  
 
Lin. Prob. 
Model 
+ Demog. 
Controls 
+ Disability 
Status 
+ DI 
History 
+ Work 
History 
Logit 
Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TERMINATEDi 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.004 0.023*** 
TERMINATEDi x 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
      
1989 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
1990 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.009*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
1991 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009** -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
1992 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
1993 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
1994 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
1996 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
1997 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.179*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
1998 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.219*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
1999 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.226*** 0.228*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
2000 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.226*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
2001 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.194*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
2002 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.165*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
2003 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.142*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
2004 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.134*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
2005 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.126*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
2006 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.117*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
2007 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.106*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
2008 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.095*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
R-sq. 0.127 0.132 0.151 0.235 0.322 -- 
Notes: ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01. Regression details are provided in the text above. All 
regressions have 930,500 observations. 
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A4. Estimates of the Earnings Effects 
In the paper, I provide a number of employment measures in addition to the annualized 
1996 SGA threshold. Below, in Table A2, I estimate the earnings effects. These estimates are 
generated using equation (1) from the paper, in the same way as is used to produce the main 
employment estimates (i.e., the bold line in Figure 4). These coefficients should be consistent, 
although because the data is skewed and non-normal it is difficult to assess statistical 
significance. As discussed in the paper, the large number of individuals without earnings in some 
years makes corrections like taking the natural logarithm of earnings or adjusting for sample 
selection sensitive to particular choices. Qualitatively, the coefficients show a similar pattern to 
those generated using employment outcomes: there are similar pre-treatment trends and a large 
post-termination response that declines beyond the year 2000. 
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Table A2 Estimates of Terminated Beneficiaries’ Relative Earnings 
  Earnings used  
Directly 
  (2) 
TERMINATEDi  203 
TERMINATEDi x 
 (268) 
  
1989  -137 
  (140) 
1990  70.7 
  (129) 
1991  268 
  (114) 
1992  236 
  (97.5) 
1993  261 
  (75.5) 
1994  73.0 
  (48.0) 
  -- 
1996  696 
  (39.6) 
1997  3823*** 
  (67.2) 
1998  5063*** 
  (82.5) 
1999  5451*** 
  (91.8) 
2000  5646*** 
  (99.6) 
2001  4991*** 
  (102) 
2002  4317*** 
  (101) 
2003  3827*** 
  (101) 
2004  3600*** 
  (102) 
2005  3354*** 
  (102) 
2006  3176*** 
  (101) 
2007  2876*** 
  (101) 
2008  2485*** 
  (98.4) 
R-sq.  0.402 
Notes: ** denotes p < 0.05, *** denotes p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses and allow for within-
person correlation in errors. The regression is as described for Figure 4 and has 930,500 observations.  
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A7. Termination Rates for the Subsamples used in the Heterogeneity Analysis 
 
Table A4 Sample Sizes and Termination Rates for Different Subsamples 
  Sample 
sizes 
Termination
Rate 
Category Subcategories (1) (2) 
All Full sample 930,500 41.3% 
    
Sex Males 742,620 42.3% 
 Females 187,880 37.4% 
    
Age at termination 30-39 years 314,020 48.2% 
 40-49 years 403,960 44.0% 
 50-61 years 212,520 26.1% 
    
Ave. earnings 3-5 years 
before applying for DI 
Earnings ≤ 0.5 x 1996 SGA 265,960 41.1% 
0.5 x 1996 SGA < Earnings ≤ 1996 SGA 203,680 44.0% 
 Ave. earnings > 1996 SGA 460,860 40.3% 
    
State unemployment rate 
in 1997 and 1998 
Ave. unemp.<4.5% 339,660 40.3% 
4.5%≤Ave. unemp.≤ 5.5% 316,480 42.8% 
 Ave. unemp.>5.5% 274,360 41.0% 
    
Primary disability when 
applying for DI 
Alcohol/drug addiction 429,120 52.0% 
Mental disorders 228,740 31.0% 
 Musculoskeletal condition 139,800 34.5% 
 Other disabilities 132,840 32.0% 
    
Type of addiction Alcohol only 544,820 37.9% 
 Alcohol and drugs 246,840 46.7% 
 Drugs only 138,840 45.2 
    
Race White 537,660 37.5% 
 Black 308,460 48.0% 
 Other race 72,400 42.5% 
    
Educational attainment <12 years 352,580 39.9% 
 12 years 336,680 41.8% 
 >12 years 91,980 41.0% 
    
SSI receipt Only received DI 113,000 37.4% 
 Initially received SSI 457,920 44.3% 
 Concurrently received SSI & DI 359,580 38.8% 
    
Allowance level Initial award 406,220 48.3% 
 Reconsideration 105,580 41.5% 
 Hearings award 418,700 34.5% 
    
Notes: Samples sizes only include individuals in the terminated and reclassified groups, rather than those 
whose status in relationship to the policy change was ambiguous. The number of individuals in each 
group is equal to the sample divided by 20.  
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A9. Assessing the Characterization of the Employment Response  
In this section, I vary the definitions of the key variables in order to test the sensitivity of 
using equation (3) to define the employment effects. Table A5 presents results where SHIFTit, 
the variable used to measure the peak employment from 1998 through to 2000, is started one 
year earlier and one year later, and where TRENDit, the variable used to measure the decline in 
employment after 2000, is started one year earlier and one year later. When SHIFTit is defined 
one year earlier, the interaction on TERMi and the year 1997 dummy variable is dropped; when 
SHIFTit is defined one year later, an interaction on TERMi and the year 1998 dummy is added.  
The respective coefficients are similar in each case. R-squared is highest in the main 
results and when SHIFTit is moved a year later. Given the latter specification has one additional 
variable (i.e., the interaction of TERMi and the 1998 dummy), this suggests that the main 
specification performs reasonably well in explaining the variation in employment outcomes. 
 
Table A5 Regression Estimates using Different Definitions of SHIFTit and TRENDit 
  
Main  
Results 
Starting 
SHIFTit one 
year earlier
Starting 
SHIFTit one 
year later 
Starting 
TRENDit one 
year earlier 
Starting 
TRENDit one 
year later 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
SHIFTit [Begins 1998] 0.220***   0.231*** 0.211*** 
 (0.003)   (0.003) (0.003) 
SHIFTit [Begins 1997]  0.211***    
     (0.003)    
SHIFTit [Begins 1999]   -0.221***   
      (0.003)   
      
DECLINEit [Begins 2001] -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016***   
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)   
DECLINEit [Begins 2000]    -0.016***  
       (0.0004)  
DECLINEit [Begins 2002]     -0.018*** 
        (0.0004) 
R-squared 0.3472 0.3470 0.3472 0.3471 0.3471 
    
Notes: ** denotes p<0.05, *** denotes p<0.01.Employment is defined as earning more than 1996 SGA 
($8,908). In the main regression, for terminated beneficiaries the dummy variable SHIFTit equals one for 
years t ≥ 1998, while DECLINEit is a dummy variable that equals t – 1999 for years t ≥ 2000. Other 
covariates include a binary variable identifying terminated beneficiaries, a full set of year dummy 
variables, the interaction of these variables for years 1989-1994 and 1996-1997, sex-specific cubic 
functions in age, and controls for individuals’ demographic, health, program history and work history 
characteristics. The reference year is 1995. Standard errors are in parentheses and allow for within-person 
correlation in errors. Each regression uses 930,500 observations.  
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A10. Exit Rates for DI Beneficiaries on the DA&A Program Prior to the Terminations 
 
Table A6 Exits due to Recovery/Medical Disqualification and Death for Different Entry Cohorts 
 Initial  
number of 
beneficiaries 
Fraction exited due 
to recovery/ medical 
disqualification 
Fraction  
died 
Entering in (1) (2) (3) 
    
1989 (7<yrs before terminations≤8)  1,694 5.43% 15.3% 
    
1990 (6<yrs before terminations≤7) 3,088 4.05% 13.2% 
       
1991 (5<yrs before terminations≤6) 4,559 2.46% 10.2% 
       
1992 (4<yrs before terminations≤5)  8,642 2.40% 7.36% 
    
1993 (3<yrs before terminations≤4) 11,628 1.20% 4.41% 
       
1994 (2<yrs before terminations≤3) 12,364 0.40% 2.63% 
    
 Aged 40-49 years in 1997 
    
1989 (7<yrs before terminations≤8)  718 4.87% 16.3% 
    
1990 (6<yrs before terminations≤7) 1,371 4.08% 13.3% 
       
1991 (5<yrs before terminations≤6) 1,937 2.22% 10.3% 
       
1992 (4<yrs before terminations≤5)  3,788 2.14% 7.37% 
    
1993 (3<yrs before terminations≤4) 5,091 0.96% 4.91% 
       
1994 (2<yrs before terminations≤3) 5,204 0.25% 2.59%
    
 Aged 30-39 years in 1997 
    
1989 (7<yrs before terminations≤8)  400 11.3% 9.25% 
    
1990 (6<yrs before terminations≤7) 749 7.48% 5.61% 
       
1991 (5<yrs before terminations≤6) 1,261 4.60% 5.08% 
       
1992 (4<yrs before terminations≤5)  2,681 4.10% 4.40% 
    
1993 (3<yrs before terminations≤4) 4,093 1.86% 2.49% 
       
1994 (2<yrs before terminations≤3) 4,586 0.72% 1.48% 
    
Notes: Beneficiaries were included if they were in current payment status in the first quarter of the year 
they entered DI (e.g., entrants in 1989 were in current payment status in the first quarter of 1990). There 
are also 15,479 individuals entering DI in 1995 and 2,395 individuals entering DI in early 1996 who meet 
this criterion but who cannot be followed for a year or more.  
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A12. Do Beneficiary Cohort Effects Explain the Differences by Time on DI? 
All of the terminations occur in January 1997, making it difficult to separate effects 
related to time on the program from effects related to differences across beneficiary cohorts. 
Several exercises are undertaken to determine if the inverted U-shaped relationship between time 
on DI and the employment effects is due to cohort effects. 
This relationship is estimated by combining the coefficients for SHIFTit and the 
interactions between SHIFTit and the cubic terms of DI_TIMEi. For reference, the relevant 
coefficients for the whole sample are presented in Column 1 of Table A7, together with the 
combined effect of the coefficients DI_TIMEi at a value of nine months and at yearly intervals 
between one and six years. This provides similar information to Column 2 of Table 2 and in 
Figure 7c in the paper. The next three columns of Table A7 contain results from similar 
regressions where controls are added or the sample is varied in order to see whether the observed 
pattern disappears. The first variation is to control for unemployment rates at the time of 
application. As discussed in the paper, labor market opportunities can potentially affect the 
decision to apply for disability benefits.  To see whether changes in unemployment rates over 
time can account for the U-shaped pattern, I add separate interactions between UNEMPi, the 
state-level unemployment rates in the year individuals applied for disability benefits, with the 
variables identifying employment differences between terminated and reclassified beneficiaries 
throughout the sample period. That is: 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ߣ ൅ ܶܧܴܯ௜ߚ଴ ൅ ܼ௜௧߮଴ ൅ ܦܫ_ܶܫܯܧ௜ ∗ ܼ௜௧߮ଵ ൅ ܦܫ_ܶܫܯܧ௜ଶ ∗ ܼ௜௧߮ଶ (A2) 
൅ܦܫ_ܶܫܯܧ௜ଷ ∗ ܼ௜௧߮ଷ ൅ ܷܰܧܯ ௜ܲ ∗ ܼ௜௧߮ସ ൅ ܷܰܧܯ ௜ܲଶ ∗ ܼ௜௧߮ହ ൅ ܷܰܧܯ ௜ܲ௜ଷ ∗ ܼ௜௧߮଺ ൅ ݑ௜௧  
  
As before, ܼ௜௧߮ሺ௡ሻ ൌ ∑ ܦ௧ ∗ ܶܧܴܯ௜ߚሺ௡ሻ௧ଵଽଽ଻௧ୀଵଽ଼ଽ௧ஷଵଽଽହ ൅	ܵܪܫܨ ௜ܶ௧ߜሺ௡ሻଵ ൅	ܦܧܥܮܫܰܧ௧ߜሺ௡ሻଶ. 
The results from this regression are presented in Column 2 of Table A7. The three 
coefficients resulting from the interaction between SHIFTit and the cubic terms of DI_TIMEi are 
similar in magnitude to the main results and remain statistically significant at the one percent 
level. The standard error on the SHIFTit coefficient is larger and it is no longer statistically 
significant at conventional levels; as a result, the differences in employment at different values of 
DI_TIMEi are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The U-shaped relationship is 
present in the point estimates, however, and the interactions between DI_TIMEi and SHIFT are 
jointly significant at the one percent level.  
‐ FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY ‐ 
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The second variation is to restrict the sample to individuals in states with relatively low 
program growth between 1989 and 1995. As discussed in the paper, the DA&A program grew 
rapidly during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Compositional changes should have been less 
important in the states with the lowest program growth. The relationship between time on DI and 
the employment effects is estimated using individuals in the 25 states with the lowest program 
growth, which is measured as the ratio of DI entrants in 1995 to 1989. The results are presented 
in Column 3 of Table A7. The four coefficients of interest are statistically significant at the one 
percent level and combine to create an inverted-U pattern that is similar to the main results. 
The third exercise is to see if changes to the DA&A program in 1994 can account for the 
U-shaped relationship. The Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act (P.L. 
103-296) was signed into law on August 15, 1994. The legislation introduced a three year time 
limit for benefits and more active case management. The new rules related to time limits were 
introduced in March 1995 and so were still two years away from taking effect when DA&A 
eligibility was removed. The case management aspects of the legislation took longer, as they 
were handled through state-level contracts. Most new contracts were issued in September 1995; 
contracts for Michigan, New York and Oregon were issued in early 1996 (Hunt and Baumohl, 
2003). 
There is not an identifiable change in the type of individuals applying for DA&A 
disability benefits after August 1994, or after the primary implementation dates (March 1st and 
September 1st of 1995). However, I examine whether the inverted-U relationship is present 
without those who applied for DI after the legislation introduced in August 1994. These results 
are presented in Column 4 of Table A7. The four primary coefficients of interest are statistically 
significant at the five percent level. The total shift in employment displays a qualitatively similar 
relationship to time on disability benefits that was produced for the whole sample. 
Finally, given some of the observable characteristics of DA&A beneficiaries changed as 
the program grew, I assess the role of time on DI for subsamples based on those changing 
characteristics. Entrants to the DA&A disability programs were increasingly female and black.  
They were also relatively more likely to report having a drug addiction and less likely to have 
only an alcohol addiction. Table A8 presents the results for some DI subsamples based on sex 
(males, females), race (white, black) and type of addiction (alcohol only, drugs). Each displays 
an inverted-U relationship that is qualitatively similar to those presented in the paper. 
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Table A7 Robustness Tests for Results in Table 2 and Figure 7 
  
Main 
Results 
With 
Unemp. Rate 
Controls 
Low  
DI Growth 
States 
Without 
Aug 1994+ 
Applicants 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
(a) SHIFTit 0.069*** -0.003 0.110*** 0.145*** 
 (0.022) (0.150) (0.036) (0.029) 
(b) SHIFTit x DI_TIMEi 0.155*** 0.150*** 0.112*** 0.080*** 
    (0.024) (0.024) (0.035) (0.028) 
(c) SHIFTit x DI_TIMEi2 -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.030*** -0.022*** 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) 
(d) SHIFTit x DI_TIMEi3 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0023*** 0.0017** 
    (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
p-value on joint test that 
DI_TIMEi affects SHIFTit  
[i.e., (b)=(c)=(d)] 
<0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
     
Total Shift in Employment for DI_TIMEi at:   
9 months 0.163*** 0.087 0.178*** 0.193*** 
 (0.009) (0.149) (0.016) (0.013) 
1 year 0.186*** 0.108 0.194*** 0.204*** 
 (0.007) (0.149) (0.012) (0.010) 
2 years 0.237*** 0.157 0.231*** 0.229*** 
 (0.005) (0.149) (0.007) (0.005) 
3 years 0.244*** 0.161 0.235*** 0.230*** 
 (0.005) (0.149) (0.007) (0.005) 
4 years 0.225*** 0.142 0.219*** 0.216*** 
 (0.005) (0.149) (0.007) (0.005) 
5 years 0.199*** 0.118 0.196*** 0.200***
 (0.007) (0.149) (0.009) (0.007)
6 years 0.188*** 0.109 0.181*** 0.191*** 
 (0.009) (0.149) (0.011) (0.009) 
     
R-sq. 0.358 0.359 0.354 0.356 
Obs. 930,500 930,500 402,240 777,400 
     
Notes: * denotes p<0.10, ** denotes p<0.05, *** denotes p<0.01.Employment is defined as earning more 
than 1996 SGA ($8,908).  For terminated beneficiaries, the dummy variable SHIFTit equals one for years t 
≥ 1998, while DECLINEit is a dummy variable equals t – 1999 for years t ≥ 2000. The variable DI_TIMEi 
measures the months on DI prior to January 1997. Other covariates include a binary variable identifying 
terminated beneficiaries, a full set of year dummy variables, the interaction of these variables for years 
1989-1994 and 1996-1997, sex-specific cubic functions in age, and controls for individuals’ demographic, 
health, program history and work history characteristics. In column (3), the regression includes 
interactions between the state unemployment rate at the time of application and the variables measuring 
employment differences between terminated and reclassified beneficiaries in the same way as is done for 
DI_TIMEi. The reference year is 1995. Standard errors are in parentheses and allow for within-person 
correlation in errors. 
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Table A8 Similarity of Results in Table 2 and Figure 7 for DI Subsamples, 
Based on Observable Characteristics that Changed over Time 
 By Sex By Race By Addiction Type 
 Males Females White Black Alcohol  Drugs  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) 
       
(a) SHIFTit 0.062** 0.089* 0.066** 0.050 0.001 0.151***
 (0.025) (0.053) (0.028) (0.041) (0.030) (0.034) 
(b) SHIFTit x DI_TIMEi 0.158*** 0.152*** 0.156*** 0.190*** 0.210*** 0.091** 
 (0.026) (0.059) (0.030) (0.044) (0.032) (0.036) 
(c) SHIFTit x DI_TIMEi2 -0.043*** -0.041** -0.044*** -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.024** 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) 
(d) SHIFTit x DI_TIMEi3 0.0033*** 0.0032* 0.0034*** 0.0045*** 0.0046*** 0.0017* 
 (0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.009) 
p-value on test that 
DI_TIMEi affects SHIFTit  
[i.e.,(b)=(c)=(d)] 
<0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.02 
   
Total Shift in Employment for DI_TIMEi at:    
9 months 0.158*** 0.181*** 0.160*** 0.164*** 0.128*** 0.206***
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) 
1 year 0.181*** 0.203*** 0.182*** 0.191*** 0.158*** 0.219***
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) 
2 years 0.233*** 0.256*** 0.232*** 0.250*** 0.226*** 0.249***
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
3 years 0.240*** 0.265*** 0.235*** 0.254*** 0.236*** 0.250***
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
4 years 0.220*** 0.249*** 0.212*** 0.231*** 0.213*** 0.233***
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
5 years 0.194*** 0.228*** 0.185*** 0.207*** 0.188*** 0.208***
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) 
6 years 0.181*** 0.221 0.173*** 0.209*** 0.188*** 0.185***
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) 
       
R-sq. 0.356 0.363 0.357 0.359 0.359 0.3482
Obs. 742,620 187,880 537,660 308,460 544,820 138,840
       
Notes: * denotes p<0.10, ** denotes p<0.05, *** denotes p<0.01. Employment is defined as earning more 
than 1996 SGA ($8,908).  For terminated beneficiaries, the dummy variable SHIFTit equals one for years t 
≥ 1998, while DECLINEit is a dummy variable equals t – 1999 for years t ≥ 2000. The variable DI_TIMEi 
measures the months on DI prior to January 1997. Other covariates include a binary variable identifying 
terminated beneficiaries, a full set of year dummy variables, the interaction of these variables for years 
1989-1994 and 1996-1997, sex-specific cubic functions in age, and controls for individuals’ demographic, 
health, program history and work history characteristics. The reference year is 1995. Standard errors are 
in parentheses and allow for within-person correlation in errors. The “Drug” subsample includes 
individuals whose addiction was both alcohol and drugs.  
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